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INTRODUCTION 
This appeal involves the legal standard for standing. Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Lawrence Brown, Marilyn Brown, Joseph Sorenson, and Kathleen Sorenson 
("Plaintiffs") and Defendant/Appellee James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") are neighbors 
residing in an area adjacent to the Little Cottonwood Creek in Murray, Utah. Mclntyre 
desired to build a bridge across Little Cottonwood Creek. On August 21, 2006, Mclntyre 
submitted an application to Defendant/Appellee Division of Water Rights of the Utah 
State Department of Natural Resources (the "Division") to obtain a permit. Plaintiffs 
opposed the application because the bridge will cause significant damage to their 
properties in times of high water flow. Nevertheless, the Division granted the permit. 
Plaintiffs then filed suit in the Third District Court against Mclntyre and the Division 
challenging the Division's decision and seeking injunctive relief. 
Mclntyre filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The district court granted 
the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs' alleged property injuries are only potential since 
they have yet to occur and may not occur in the future. The court stated that "[i]f, down 
the road[,j construction of the bridge starts these possible events in action, Plaintiffs 
would then have standing to assert their claims." See Addendum ("Add."), at 5, n.l 
(district court decision). 
This ruling is incorrect as a matter of law. It is well established that even the risk 
of injury is sufficient for standing purposes and that a party facing such risk need not wait 
until the harm actually occurs before taking legal action. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the 
1 
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. {"Sierra Club"\ 2006 UT 74, f 29 ("If the emissions 
from the proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of those persons who 
live in the area, we see no reason why those residents must actually develop a health 
problem before they have standing.") (emphasis added). The trial court's ruling should 
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether persons facing potential injury to their properties and homes from a 
neighbor's actions have standing to sue to stop the injury before it occurs or rather 
must wait until their properties are actually damaged. 
Standard of Review. As set forth more fully below, "[w]hether a plaintiff has 
standing is a question of law" and this Court "accord[s] no deference to the ruling of the 
trial court." Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, ^ 9 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Preservation. This issue was the subject of Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss, which 
Plaintiffs opposed. (R. 125-35.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 provides that "any person aggrieved by an order of the 
state engineer may obtain judicial review." Whether a person is "aggrieved" under this 
provision is governed by the traditional standing requirements in the decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E 
A. 
Mclnt)1--1 applied to the Division for a permit to build a bridge across Little 
Cot tonwood Creek. Over Plaintiffs' objection, the Divis ion granted the application. 
seeking injunctive relief. The district court granted Mc ln ty r e ' s mot ion to dismiss the 
action for lack of standing. Plaintiffs appeal, 
B. Course of Proceedings a n d Decision Below. 
On August 2 1 , 2006, Mclntyre filed an application with the Divis ion to construct a 
1,;
"<iwi ^ r o s - T \M- Cottonwood ^rccl ':* v 10 :~n September 20. ^OiV **i 
response U-,. , . , ( ! i r i tvuuwh . . . . J ; I , ; I IS submitted .*. . .a ; .») , M; 
— - • < <* V-nIu\nY- - * obei ^vu <j\. J 5 J 8 -
^ ' . ^  ' leu-.--* *: ..MHHi. in accordance with the requirements of I Hah CoCu A m c 6^-
I6h 13 and I ) tah t V.di i: lii i Code § R655 6 1 5 I laintiffs subi i lifted a request for 
reconsidera lit* ' ^ . "s a pprc \ al (R I he Division denied the 
request for reeonsiderali- -> November 17 ,2006 . (H 
On De^cn l O c i L J1', 1*\ M i\ I"., j 'laintiffs filed a I w.ii.wi, K,4 adicial Review of Infor mal 
Administrate e Proceedh lgs ai id !^ gencj \ ctior
 J|L Lai lit for Ii iji iiictii e R elief 
("Complaint") in the Third District Court challenging the Div is ion ' s action (R 1 ) I he 
Complain t named the Divisiori,, the State Engineei , and Mcln tyre as defendants On 
j a i u 1111" \' I { 1111 Il" 1 1 1 1 1 i I i»i mi ( II "in 1 1 1 1 11 I  Il I " 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 1 » i n i in mi in I"11 mi mi 1 11 i in I »II I  Il II I il in i mi i 1 Il 11 s in n i s s 
c la iming Plaintiffs lacked standing. ( R
 AA^., On January 29, 2007 , Mcln ty re filed the 
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actual Motion to Dismiss. (R. 143.) On January 24, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 125.) The 
Court heard oral arguments on April 16, 2007. 
On April 20, 2007, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision granting Mclntyre's 
motion to dismiss. (R. 214-18; see also Add. at 1-5.) On May 14, 2007, the Court 
entered an order dismissing all claims, including against the Division, based on its 
finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing. (R. 220-21; see also Add. at 7-8.) On June 11, 
2007, Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 236, 239.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges the following well-pleaded facts: Plaintiffs reside in 
Murray, Utah along Little Cottonwood Creek. (R. 2-3.) Their neighbor, Mclntyre, seeks 
to build a bridge across the Creek. (R. 3.) The bridge would span an environmentally 
fragile area which is and has been the site of significant flooding as recently as 1984. 
(R. 3.) The bridge will diminish the stream's ability to conduct high water flows and 
thereby increase the risk and danger of flooding, unnecessarily and adversely affecting 
the surrounding environment. (R. 4-5.) Specifically, construction of the bridge and the 
associated access ramps will alter the channel of the stream and thereby (1) diminish the 
natural channel's ability to conduct high water flows, (2) heighten the potential for 
damming, and thus (3) increase the risk of flooding and the damage caused by flooding in 
the surrounding areas, including the area where Plaintiffs reside. (R. 5.) 
The proposed location of the bridge is already in an area of high flood risk. (R. 5.) 
The approved bridge, if constructed, increases the already high flood risk and danger to 
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Plaintiffs and other surrounding properties and landowners. (R. 5.) In the event flooding 
occurs due in \ A t lole or in part to the construction of the bridge, the natural stream 
waters.. (R. 5.) 
As se< ..-:«J - Miiii>iaiiiK .ii»-> - ^ { ,,: viigiiiccnng linn, Secor 
liifniictlHHLil PSivoi "III " n i | , | ' , /" l ! l " , IMUMIIIII1 r l la l l r nil lln uiiisdmik limn Il linn hndne 
in its proposed location. (R. ;:.» The Secor Report, which was attached to the Complaint, 
demonstrates that the approved bridge design provides for a one-foot clearance over a 
hil'h w i l i i iiiiiiiiill Il 'i 1 i i i iiiliiiii Hi ! I | mi in annul ill" "H I I l l o u n u \\M\\ din' l i n e 
previously exceeded the one-foot clearance level of the proposed bridge.. On June 1, 
1984, the flow through I ittle Cottonwood. Creek exceeded 70° b of the design water 
Such water levels would flow over, and significantly increase the stress on, the bridge as 
approved. (R 5 -6.) The Secor Report, also demonstrates that if flows similar to those in 
die stream banks iu overflow and inundate the lirsl-le\el flood 
plains on both sides of the stream in the vicinity of the bridge, Such an event will cause 
neighbors adjacent to the bridge (R 5-6 ) 
Even If an alternative bridge design were considered, the risk of damage to 
riaintiffs' proper ties \ v ould per sist (R 6 ) 1 1 i.e Sec onsiders r aisiiiji, I lie deck 
of the proposed bridge to 7 .5 feet (6.5 feet to address the 1984 water flows plus one 
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additional foot of clearance). (R. 6.) The access ramps on both sides of the deck would 
also have to be raised to meet the adjusted deck height. (R. 6.) Although such a design 
change would accommodate increased water flow, the adjusted access ramps could create 
a dam for debris caught on the bridge. (R. 6.) Because the bridge deck would be at a 
higher elevation than the surrounding stream banks, water dammed-up by debris caught 
on the deck and access ramps could quickly rise above the stream banks and flood onto 
the surrounding first-level floodplains. (R. 6.) 
There has already been subsidence of Plaintiffs' properties in areas close to Little 
Cottonwood Creek. (R. 6.) Foundation and settling cracks have already appeared in 
Plaintiffs' homes as a result of the subsidence. (R. 6.) Plaintiffs allege and maintain that 
if construction of the bridge goes forward, irreparable harm to their homes and properties 
will result. (R. 6.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The law of standing exists to ensure that a plaintiff has a personal stake in the 
litigation, as opposed to a general or ideological grievance best addressed through the 
political branches. Standing requirements establish a minimal threshold that weeds out 
those who lack a concrete interest in the case. But standing analysis is not intended to 
determine the merits of a plaintiff s claim. Under established Utah law, a party has 
standing if it (1) asserts that it has been or will be adversely impacted by the challenged 
actions, (2) alleges a causal connection between the injury, the challenged actions, and 
the relief requested in the lawsuit, and (3) seeks relief that is substantially likely to 
redress the alleged injury. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,129. 
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Plaintiffs readily meet these requirements. As alleged in the Complaint, 
Mclntyre's proposed bridge directly endangers not generalized interests but Plaintiffs' 
homes and properties. There is a close causal relationship between those potential 
injuries, Defendants' actions, and the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek. And the injunctive 
relief sought would redress the threatened injury. 
The district court rejected this straightforward analysis because the physical 
damage to Plaintiffs' properties has not yet occurred. This was error on two grounds. 
First, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that even "potential" harm can give rise 
to standing. Id. Second, the potential for injury or an increased risk of injury is itself a 
current injury sufficient to support standing. 
None of which is to say that Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on the merits. The 
legal merit of Plaintiffs' action is not at issue here. The only issue is whether Plaintiffs 
have alleged a sufficient stake in the outcome to satisfy the relatively low threshold for 
standing. They plainly have. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS ARE AGGRIEVED PARTIES 
WHO HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION. 
A. General Standing Principles. 
"Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not 
constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States Constitution 
requiring 'cases' and 'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah 
Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). Nevertheless, Utah 
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courts require that a plaintiff have a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation. Id. 
This requirement "is intended to confine the courts to a role consistent with the separation 
of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction of the courts to those disputes which are most 
efficiently and effectively resolved through the judicial process." Id. Adverse parties 
with a personal stake in the outcome ensure that the court has "a concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "It is generally insufficient," therefore, "for a 
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he shares in common with members of the public 
at large." Id. at 1148. Such "generalized grievances . . . are more appropriately directed 
to the legislative and executive branches of the state government." Id. 
To assure that a plaintiff challenging the Division's approval of an application has 
a personal stake in the outcome, Utah law limits appeals to those who are "aggrieved" by 
an agency decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 ("any person aggrieved by an order 
of the state engineer may obtain judicial review"). Whether a party is aggrieved involves 
the same analysis as the "traditional standing requirement that a plaintiff show 
particularized injury." Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 
UT 58, If 1130. The Utah Supreme Court has established three elements to this 
determination: 
First, the party must assert that it has been or will be adversely affected by 
the challenged actions. Second, the party must allege a causal relationship 
between the injury to the party, the challenged actions, and the relief 
requested. Third, the relief requested must be substantially likely to redress 
the injury claimed. If the party can satisfy these three criteria, the party has 
standing to pursue its claims before the courts of this state. 
8 
Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, If 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
As shown more fully below, Plaintiffs have alleged a particularized injury and 
have a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation. They have not asserted a 
generalized grievance and are not trying to use the courts to wage a "political or 
ideological dispute[] about the performance of government." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, 
If 17. Nor are they "roving environmental ombudsm[e]n seeking to right environmental 
wrongs wherever [t]he[y] find them," but rather are "real person[s] who own[] real 
home[s] . . . in close proximity" to Little Cottonwood Creek and the proposed bridge. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir. 2000). There 
should be no concern here about the adjudication of this case infringing on the proper 
role of any branch of government. 
B, Standard of Review. 
As noted, "[w]hether a plaintiff has standing is a question of law" and this Court 
"accord[s] no deference to the ruling of the trial court." Stocks v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, f^ 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, this 
case was dismissed on the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). (R. 252 at 12-13.) On a 
motion to dismiss, the court must presume true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint. 
St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).1 This 
is so even for the threshold issue of standing. "For purposes of ruling on a motion to 
1
 The court may also consider the materials that were attached to the complaint. See 
Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertson's Inc., 2004 UT 101, \ 10 ("The rules are clear that 
documents attached to a complaint are incorporated into the pleadings for purposes of 
judicial notice and are fair game for this court to consider in addition to the complaint's 
averments."). 
9 
dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all 
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the 
complaining party." Warth v. Seldin, All U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
Thus, although it is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate standing, "[a]t the 
pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's 
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss, [the court] presume[s] that general 
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).2 It is enough at the pleading stage, for 
example, for the plaintiffs to "allege[] that they could prove causation" - an element of 
standing - if given the chance: "that is all that is required at this phase." Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74, % 32. Otherwise, a full investigation of causation on a motion to dismiss 
"would, in many cases, supplant the trial process on the merits of the underlying claim." 
Id. And it "would be unduly burdensome for litigants to invest the time and money in 
gathering the evidence necessary to prove their claim only to be denied standing." Id. 
Here, the matter was decided on the pleadings, so this Court must accept as true 
the material allegations in the Complaint and construe them and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom in favor of Plaintiffs. 
2
 The plaintiffs burden increases "with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation," so that in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, for example, a plaintiff could no longer rely on the pleadings. Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 561. But even at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff only has to establish that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether standing exists. See Central Delta 
Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Steel Company 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998)). 
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C. The Complaint Establishes Plaintiffs' Standing. 
1. Plaintiffs have alleged and will prove personalized injuries, 
Mclntyre's primary argument, and the ruling of the district court, was that 
Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved" parties because their injuries are only "potential." But this 
ignores the fact, well-recognized by the Utah Supreme Court and courts around the 
country, that the potential for injury and increased risk of injury are sufficient to establish 
standing. 
The Utah Supreme Court made this principle clear in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74. In 
that case, the Sierra Club sought judicial review after the Executive Secretary of the 
Division of Air Quality granted a permit to the Sevier Power Company to construct a 
coal-fired power plant near the Colorado Plateau, an area known for its "stunning 
geography and outdoor recreational sites." Id. \ 2. To support its standing, the Sierra 
Club submitted affidavits from three of its members. The first, Mr. Cass, was a 
videographer who had filmed and produced documentaries on the Colorado Plateau. He 
alleged that the plant would emit pollutants that would impair visibility and affect his 
livelihood, and also that the plant would decrease the value of his property and impair his 
health. Id. ^ 4. The second, Ms. Roberts, alleged that the plant would emit pollutants 
that would contaminate the soil and damage the crops of her nearby farm, and also that 
the emissions would affect her health. Id. ^ 5. The third, Mr. Cherry, expressed "general 
concerns about the adverse health effects and the inversions" the plant would cause. 
Id. 16. 
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The Court held that Mr. Cass and Ms. Roberts had alleged sufficient facts to 
confer standing, but not Mr. Cherry. "Mr. Cass and Ms. Roberts have met the adverse 
effects requirement because they either live or recreate, or both, near the site of the plant 
and have alleged injuries particular to them, rather than expressing generalized concerns 
about the plant's impact on the public at large." Id. \ 28. In contrast, Mr. Cherry had 
alleged only a generalized concern. "Expressions of concern, without a claim of actual or 
potential injury to the party, are too generalized to qualify as a distinct and palpable 
injury under the traditional criteria." Id. \ 27 (emphasis added). 
In short, Mr. Cass's and Ms. Robert's specific concerns about potential health 
risks were sufficient to confer standing - even before the harm actually developed. "If 
the emissions from the proposed power plant have the potential to harm the health of 
those persons who live in the area, we see no reason why those residents must actually 
develop a health problem before they have standing." Id. \ 29 (emphasis added). 
The Complaint alleges specific potential harms to Plaintiffs' properties. Plaintiffs 
attached to their Complaint hydrological engineering reports from the engineering firm of 
Secor International, Inc. (R. 64-87.) While Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to 
conduct discovery and to perform extensive engineering evaluations regarding the impact 
of the proposed bridge, the Secor Report establishes the following: 
Building the proposed bridge . . . could create a channel constriction - a 
point in the channel which would, under high flow conditions, provid[e] an 
opportunity for typical debris, vegetation/trees, rocks, and any other urban 
materials to catch, backing up water. If the stream flow is backed up, 
inundation of the 1st level flood plane on both sides of the stream channel 
is at significant risk. 
12 
The Brown Residence is located on the river terrace, directly above the 
escarpment along the west side of the Creek. With the instabilities 
observed in and around the escarpment, as well as the settlement cracks, 
further erosion at the escarpment may increase the risks for significant 
property damage. As proposed, construction of the bridge could increase 
the potential for further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the 
potential for significant property damage or worse. 
(R. 64 [emphasis added].) 
Currently, a steep, exposed hill, devoid of plant growth, grass or any foliation lies 
directly to the east between the Browns' home and the Creek, which escarpment provides 
lateral support to the Browns' home. Over time, erosion has worn away the steep 
exposed hill exposing alluvial soils at its base to the ever-running flow of the creek. 
(R. 25.) That escarpment is the west bank of the creek, just down grade from the 
proposed bridge. 
Mclntyre has argued that the alleged potential damage is not a "particularized 
claim of damage to the Plaintiffs" because the property where the escarpment sits is 
owned by another neighbor that is not a party to this suit. (R. 117.) However, erosion to 
the west bank escarpment has already caused significant settlement and signs of collapse 
on the Browns' property and in their home. As explained by Secor, accelerated erosion 
resulting from flooding on the first-level flood plane caused by the flow restriction of the 
proposed bridge will result in additional settlement, collapse, and ultimately the 
destruction of the Browns' property. 
The Sorenson property is also situated above and adjacent to property lying 
directly in the first level flood plain. Damage to that property will undermine the lateral 
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support to the Sorenson property. In sum, a flood on the first-level flood plane will 
impair the integrity of the ground supporting Plaintiffs' homes. 
Simply put, the construction of the bridge has the potential of causing significant 
damage to Plaintiffs' properties. Flooding of the first-level flood plane will cause further 
erosion of the escarpment, increasing the potential "for significant property damage or 
worse." (R. 64.) This is true with respect to the property owned by the Sorensons and 
the property owned by the Browns. 
These allegations, in and of themselves, are enough to establish standing. 
Plaintiffs "have alleged injuries that are particular to them, rather than expressing 
generalized concerns about the [bridge's] impact on the public at large." Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74, f 28. They have not, in contrast to Mr. Cherry in Sierra Club, alleged 
merely generalized concerns about the effect of the bridge on the environment at large. 
Plaintiffs' injuries are particularized and they plainly have a personal stake in the 
outcome of this litigation. To be sure, the ultimate injuries are only potential injuries. 
But the Utah Supreme Court in Sierra Club held that potential injuries are sufficient to 
confer standing. Moreover, as Plaintiffs will now show, it is well accepted that potential 
injury or increased risk of injury is itself an injury for standing purposes. 
2. The potential for injury and increased risk of injury are 
sufficient to support standing. 
Potential injury and the increased risk of injury are themselves current injuries. In 
construing the more restrictive federal standing requirements, "[t]he Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III 
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standing requirements." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 160 
(4th Cir. 2000) (citing cases); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th 
Cir. 1996) ("That the injury is cast in terms of future impairment rather than past 
impairment is of no moment."). "Courts have . . . left no doubt that threatened injury . . . 
is by itself injury in fact," the Fourth Circuit said in a case involving potential 
environmental injury. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 204 F.3d at 160. "Threats or increased 
risk thus constitutes cognizable harm." Id. Such threats, the court added, are 
"probabilistic. And yet other circuits have had no trouble understanding the injurious 
nature of risk itself." Id. The Ninth Circuit has likewise stated, "[Threatened injury 
constitutes injury in fact." Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 
947 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Courts have also recognized that the potential likelihood of the injury does not 
have to be great to confer standing. In Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 
328 (7th Cir. 1993), the Village brought suit to enjoin the Corps of Engineers from 
granting a permit for construction of a radio tower in the floodplain of a creek near the 
village. The Village asserted that the creek was "flood-prone" and that the radio tower 
would increase the risk of flooding by limiting the creek's drainage area. The court held 
this was a legally cognizable injury. "The injury is of course probabilistic, but even a 
small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy - to take a suit out 
of the category of the hypothetical - provided, of course that the relief sought would, if 
granted, reduce the probability." Id. at 329 (emphasis added) (citing Pennell v. San Jose, 
485 U.S. 1 (1988), md Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980)). 
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In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 
the plaintiffs sued the Forest Service asserting that a logging plan approved over an 
alternative supported by the plaintiffs would not clear enough dead timber and thus 
would increase the risk of wildfires, which would affect their use of the area for hiking 
and camping. The difference in the plans was minor. The Forest Service selected a 
logging plan that reduced potential wildfire fuels by 5.4%, rather than the plaintiffs' 
preferred plan, which reduced them by 14.2%. "The district court was unimpressed by 
the difference" between the proposed alternatives, "branding a claim of increased wildfire 
risk as 'mere speculation.'" Id. at 1234. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, noting that the 
increase in risk required for standing may be inversely proportional to the degree of 
potential hatm: 
Of course for a probabilistic event such as a wildfire, almost any act (other 
than, say, deliberate setting of a fire) merely affects probabilities, but we do 
not understand the customary rejection of "speculative" causal links as 
ruling out all probabilistic injuries. The more drastic the injury that 
government action makes more likely, the lesser the increment in 
probability necessary to establish standing. . . . [T]he potential destruction 
of fire is so severe that relatively modest increments in risk should qualify 
for standing. 
Id. 
Additionally, "the fact that the potential injury would be the result of a chain of 
events need not destroy the standing claim." 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's 
Federal Practice § 101.40[7][a] (3d ed.) (citing Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 
956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
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It is also important to recognize that proving the increased risk of injury goes to 
the merits of the claim and should not be addressed as a matter of standing. By 
dismissing this case on the pleadings, the district court cut short the very process by 
which Plaintiffs would prove the significance of the risk caused by the bridge. In Sutton 
v. St Jude Medical SC. Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff brought suit on 
behalf of a class of "as-of-yet uninjured" individuals alleging that a medical device 
implanted during bypass surgery increased the risk for aortic bypass stenosis. Id. at 570. 
The trial court said the alleged injury was "'purely hypothetical'" and thus denied 
standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed: '"[C]ourts have long recognized that an increased 
risk of harm, which the plaintiff alleges, is an injury-in-fact.'" Id. at 573-74 (quoting In 
re Propulsid Prod. Liability Litigation, 208 F.R.D. 133, 139 (E.D. La. 2002)). The court 
then held that it was improper to require the plaintiff to show as part of the standing 
inquiry how significant the increased risk may be. "[T]o require a plaintiff to so clearly 
demonstrate her injury in order to confer standing is to prematurely evaluate the merits of 
her claims." Id. at 575. The court in Sutton also recognized the value of allowing a 
plaintiff to address a problem before the injury occurs. "[T]here is something to be said 
for disease prevention, as opposed to disease treatment. Waiting for a plaintiff to suffer 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the merits inquiry is separate from the 
standing inquiry, and that it is neither "necessary [n]or appropriate for us to consider the 
merits of the petitioners' claim in deciding whether they have standing." Society of 
Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 n.3 (Utah 1987); 
see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (although standing may exist in certain 
cases based solely on a statute creating a legal right, the invasion of which creates 
standing, "standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that 
particular conduct is illegal"). 
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physical injury before allowing any redress whatsoever is both overly harsh and 
economically inefficient." Id. 
Moreover, because the risk of injury is itself an injury for standing purposes, 
inevitability and immediacy of the ultimate injury are not prerequisites to standing. In 
Dimarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978), the court held that inmates concerned 
about the risk of fire at the prison had standing. The defendant, the court said, "inaptly 
construes the requirement of injury as requiring proof that the inmates inevitably will 
suffer physical injury or death from fire before they have standing to challenge the 
hazardous fire conditions . . . existing at [the prison]. . . . One need not wait for the 
conflagration before concluding that a real and present threat exists." Id. at 18; see also 
Sutton, 419 F.3d at 572 (plaintiff is not required to show "immediacy" of the injury to 
have standing). 
That risk of future harm is itself a concrete injury is plain to see. Risk of future 
damage to one's property can decrease the current value of the property, increase the 
costs of insurance, and create costs to ameliorate the risk. It simply cannot be the case 
that Plaintiffs must wait for the ultimate injury to occur before they can sue. This Court 
should not ignore "the injurious nature of risk itself." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston 
Copper, 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000). 
To hold otherwise would leave plaintiffs who suffer real harm from the mere risk 
of injury without any redress. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978), a group of plaintiffs sued over the approval for 
construction of a nuclear power plant. Part of their alleged injuries was the risk of a 
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nuclear accident. In rejecting the assertion that the claim was not ripe because "no 
nuclear accident has yet occurred," the Supreme Court held that the legal issues were 
sufficiently concrete to be ready for decision. Importantly, the Court recognized that 
"delayed resolution of these issues would foreclose any relief from the present injury 
suffered by appellees - relief that would be forthcoming if they were to prevail. . . ." Id. 
at 82 (emphasis added). A nuclear meltdown does not have to occur before a plaintiff 
can sue. This case does not involve a potential nuclear meltdown, but to Plaintiffs - who 
are prepared to prove that the proposed bridge poses a real threat to their homes - the 
threatened injury is very significant indeed. 
At the hearing on Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss, the following exchange took 
place between the trial court and Mclntyre: 
THE COURT: Assuming I grant your motion to dismiss and then the 
worse fears are realized that you put the bridge in, it's causing stoppage. 
You cannot clear it out. It's caused the erosion, and it's caused the erosion 
to the effect of the Brown[s] and the Sorenson[s] are directly aggrieved on 
it, what happens at that point. 
MR. MCINTYRE: I think they have, at that point, the right to -
they're not precluded from a right to file an action for injunction. But what 
does it have to do with the state's engineer - engineer's decision to put - or 
allow the bridge to be put in. 
THE COURT: Yeah. But what I'm saying is, that it would be two 
separate issues in my mind. That if the worse fears are realized -
MR. MCINTYRE: Right. 
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THE COURT: - after you['re] dismissed out of the case, then they're 
not barred by filing another lawsuit asking that bridge to be removed? 
MR.MCINTYRE: Oh, absolutely not. Why would it be? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(R. 252 at 12-13.) 
If this colloquy accurately stated the law, then potential plaintiffs would have to sit 
back and wait for the worst case scenario before they could sue to protect themselves. 
Fortunately, as Plaintiffs have demonstrated, that is not the law. Plaintiffs have alleged a 
particularized injury and should therefore be permitted to move forward to try and prove 
their claims on the merits. 
3. The Complaint alleges causation. 
In Sierra Club, the Utah Supreme Court had little difficulty in finding that the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged causation. "Because the Executive Secretary [was] 
responsible for denying or granting permits for the construction and operation of the 
plant," the Court reasoned, "his decision to grant the order is directly connected to the 
construction and operation of the plant and to any resulting harms." Sierra Club, 2006 
UT 74, f 32. And "[r]ather than raising general allegations that the mere presence of a 
coal-fired power plant will cause the alleged harms, the affidavits point to specific 
aspects of the plant that will cause specific harms." Id. The Court recognized that 
although the plaintiffs had not offered proof of their allegations but rather had alleged a 
"plausible connection between their injuries and the order authorizing the plant," they 
nevertheless had "alleged that they could prove causation, and that is all that is required 
on 
at this phase." Id, (emphasis added). To require proof of causation at the pleading stage 
would "supplant the trial process on the merits of the underlying claim." Id. 
This analysis applies equally here. Plaintiffs' injuries are directly caused by the 
Division's approval of the permit to build the proposed bridge. And Plaintiffs have 
pointed to specific aspects of the bridge that will cause specific harms. 
4. The relief Plaintiffs seek would redress their injuries. 
As to whether the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs in Sierra Club were redressable, 
the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
[T]he Board has the power to redress the [plaintiffs'] injuries. Through the 
Sierra Club, the [plaintiffs] have requested that the Board declare the air 
emissions permit illegal, revoke the order, and remand the matter to the 
Division of Air Quality for further analysis. Because the Board is the only 
party with the authority to grant this relief, it has the power to redress the 
Sierra Club's injury by declaring the permit illegal or at least referring the 
permit to the Division of Air Quality for further analysis to ensure that the 
Executive Secretary's order authorizing the plant's operation complies with 
state and federal law. 
A/. If 33. 
The analysis is the same here. The Division has the authority to revoke the permit 
granted to Mclntyre. Doing so would immediately redress the injuries Plaintiffs have 
alleged. Those injuries - the potential harm and increased risk caused by the bridge - are 
directly tied to the approval and construction of the bridge. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it ruled that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this 
action. This Court should reverse the district court's order of dismissal and remand the 
case for further proceedings on the merits. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs hereby request oral argument because it will materially assist this Court 
in resolving the issues in this case. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of December, 2007. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Benson!,. Hathawayflr. 
Alexander Dushku 
Peter C. Schofield 
Justin W Starr 
Attorneys for Appellants/Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE BROWN, MARILYN BROWN, 
JOSEPH SORENSON AND KATHLEEN 
SORENSON, i n d i v i d u a l s , 
P l a i n t i f f s / P e t i t i o n e r s , 
vs. 
THE DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JERRY OLDS in his capacity as 
the Utah State Engineer, and 
JAMES A. McINTYRE, an 
individual, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 060920127 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
April 16, 2002.. „ ^_ 
FRED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By, 
2 0 2D07 
gAi&AKE COUNTY 
peputy Clerk 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant James A. Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss. The Court 
heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 16, 2007. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Plaintiffs and Defendant James A. Mclntyre ("Mclntyre") all 
reside in an area adjacent to Little Cottonwood Creek located in 
Murray, Utah. Mclntyre desires to construct a bridge from one 
side of Little Cottonwood Creek to the other. On August 21, 
2006, Mclntyre submitted an application with the Division of 
Water Rights of the Utah State Department of Natural Resources 
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(nthe Division") for the construction of the bridge. Plaintiffs 
opposed the construction before the Division arguing such would 
cause significant damage to their property. The Division 
ultimately granted Mclntyre's application for a Stream Channel 
Alteration Permit and Plaintiffs initiated this action. 
In support of his motion Mclntyre asserts Plaintiffs are not 
aggrieved persons and have no standing to seek judicial review of 
the administrative agency's action. Indeed, asserts Mclntyre, 
unlike the process by which comments are accepted from persons 
who may be interested in a project, the right to seek judicial 
review is limited to those individuals who can "show some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute." Wash. County Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58 f 20 (quoting Nat'l Parks & 
Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1993). In the instant, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs only 
argue that significant damage and injury to their property will 
result. 
While Mclntyre admits that the Secor Report, attached to the 
Complaint, does note some erosion problems for the escarpment on 
the creek's west bank, this is irrelevant, argues Defendant, as 
that escarpment property does not belong to Plaintiffs or 
Mclntyre, but to Jan Glines-Calder Further, asserts Mclntyre, 
AAA -.1 
BROWN v. DIVISION Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that damage has nothing to do with the bridge, but rather, the 
fact that the western side of the bank has not been armored. 
Additionally, argues Mclntyre, as to their claim for 
injunctive relief, such should be dismissed as Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege facts necessary to support their claim. 
Specifically, asserts Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have only alleged that 
there is evidence of subsidence and cracking and that has 
occurred without the bridge. Moreover, contends Mclntyre, he 
agrees that if the bridge causes damage to Plaintiffs' property 
he may be liable, accordingly, the harm is not irreparable. 
Further, argues Mclntyre, Plaintiffs have failed to describe 
a particular injury they will suffer, how an injunction would not 
be adverse to public interest, or that they have a substantial 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing, as set forth in the 
case of Bonham v\ Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989), any "person 
aggrieved," not just a water user or person whose property lies 
on the banks of a creek, may seek review of State Engineer action 
pursuant to a proposed change application. See Id. at 498. 
Like the plaintiffs in Bonham, assert Plaintiffs, they have 
alleged that significant damage to their property will result 
from the construction of the proposed bridge. Moreover, contend 
Plaintiffs, the engineering reports attached as exhibits to 
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Plaintiff's Complaint plainly set forth the potential damage that 
Plaintiffs may incur should the proposed bridge be constructed. 
With respect to Mclntyre's arguments regarding injunctive 
relief, Plaintiffs assert they do not at this time seek either a 
Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction. Rather, 
assert Plaintiffs, they request that the Court grant permanent 
injunctive relief as a remedy due to the damage that will be 
sustained should the proposed bridge be constructed. Through the 
course of this proceeding, contend Plaintiffs, they will 
demonstrate their entitlement to equitable relief in the form of 
a permanent injunction, as the potential damages they will suffer 
if the bridge is constructed will be irreparable and legal 
remedies are inadequate. 
To establish standing under the statute, a person must 
demonstrate they have suffered or would suffer a distinct and 
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the 
outcome. In the instant then, the Court must ask how far should 
is the "would suffer" be stretched? Indeed, while the 
engineering reports do indicate that " [i]f the stream flow is 
backed up, inundation of the 1st level flood plane on both sides 
of the stream channel is at significant risk," and further that, 
"construction of the bridge could increase the potential for 
further escarpment erosion and therefore, increase the potential 
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for significant property damage or worse," the question is, does 
this establish standing? While the report set outs potential 
problems that could occur if certain events come to fruition, the 
Court is persuaded such requires great speculation to find it 
demonstrates an outcome which "would" occur. Accordingly, 
dismissal as requested is appropriate and, consequently, 
granted.l 
DATED this day of April, 2007. 
GLENN K. IWASAK3 
DISTRICT COURT 
xIf, down the road construction of the bridge starts these 
possible events in action, Plaintiffs would then have standing to 
assert their claims. 
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